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A modified protocol is proposed which prevents cheating in the 
Online multiple secret sharing scheme proposed by Pinch. 
Introduction: The goal of a secret sharing scheme is to distribute a 
secret among a group of participants in such a way that the secret 
can be reconstructed by designated subsets of participants. An 
important issue in a secret sharing scheme is that the reconstruc-
tion procedure must provide the valid secret to all participants 
from an authorised set. That is, a dishonest participant must not 
be able to fool the others so that they obtain an invalid secret 
while the deceiver is able to get the valid secret. This problem has 
been discussed by several authors (see, for example, [1 - 3]). 
Cachin [4] proposed a computationally secure scheme for online 
secret sharing with general access structures, where all the shares 
are as short as the secret. The scheme provides the ability to share 
multiple secrets and allows us to add participants dynamically, 
without having to redistribute new shares. These abilities are real-
ised by storing additional authentic information at a publicly 
accessible location. 
Pinch [5] points out that Cachin's scheme does not allow shares 
to be reused after the secret has been reconstructed without a fur-
ther distributed computation protocol such as that of Goldreich et 
al. [6]. Pinch presents a modified protocol for computationally 
secure online secret sharing,. based on the intractability of the 
Diffie-Hellman problem, where shares can be reused. 
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In this Letter, we show that Pinch's scheme is vulnerable to 
cheating. We then modify it to prevent cheating. 
Pinch s scheme: M is a cyclic group of order q (written multiplica-
tively) in which the Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable (that is, 
given elements g, gx and gY in M, it is computationally infeasible to 
obtain gXY) and! M ~ G is a one-way function. The group opera-
tions in G and M are addition and multiplication modulo a large 
primep. 
The set P of participants is denoted by P" ... , Pn" Certain sub-
sets X E 2P are authorised to recover the secret K. The family of 
minimal authorised sets of participants is denoted by r (an 
authorised set XI is minimal if XI !;;; X2, and ~ E r implies that XI 
= X2). 
Pinch's protocol works as follows : The dealer D, who knows 
the secret K, randomly chooses shares Si (integers prime to q) for 
each participant Pi E P and transmits Si over a secure channel to 
Pi' For each minimal authorised set X E r, IXI = t, the dealer ran-
domly chooses gx to be a generator of M and computes 
Tx = K _ f(giLEX BX) 
and posts the pair (gx, Tx) on the notice board. To recover the 
secret K, a minimal authorised set X = {Pb ... , PJ of participants 
comes together and performs the folloWing steps: 
(i) member PI reads gx from the notice board, forms g;1 and 
passes the result to P2; 
(ii) each subsequent member Pi' for 1 < i < t, receives g j .B,-l 
and raises this value to the power si to form g t,Si which is 
passed to Pi+ I; 
(iii) the fmal participant Pt receives gj ... s,l and raises this 
value to the power St to form 
11 Bx V - g81 ... 8, _ 9 xEX X - X - x 
(iv) on behalf of the access set X, member Pt reads Tx from 
the notice board and reconstructs K as K = Tx + f (Vx). 
If there are multiple secrets K, to share, then it is possible to use 
the same one-way function f, provided that each entry on the 
notice board has a fresh value of gx attached. 
Pinch also has a variant proposal which, according to him, 
avoids the necessity for the fIrst participant PI to reveal g;1 at step 
(i). PI takes r modulo q at random and forms g ~I and passes the 
result to P2, and so on. At the end of protocol, Pt returns the com-
puted value gir "sl to PI which computes 
-1 
Vx = (g';t, ... 8'f (mod p) 
where ,I is the inverse of r, that is r x ,I = I mod q (the other 
parts of the protocol are the same as the original protocol). 
How to cheat: Pinch's scheme has a major disadvantage in that it 
is vulnerable to cheating. In this scheme, a dishonest participant Pi 
E X may contribute his fake share s'i = asi, where a is a random 
integer modulo q. Since every participant ~f an authorised set X 
(IXI = t) has access to the fmal result g;;",si't, the participant Pi 
can calculate the value 
11 Bx - g81 ... 8, ... 8, _ 9 xEX - V - x - x - x 
and hence the correct secret as in Pinch's scheme, while the other 
participants calculate an invalid secret. 
Remark: Cachin's scheme is secure against this form of cheating, 
because in his scheme participants have no access to Vx = 1:xe xSx • 
Thus, if a participant contributes a fake share, he cannot modify 
the result to obtain the valid secret (the function f is assumed to 
be one-way). 
How to detect cheating: Suppose in the initialisation phase of the 
Pinch scheme, the dealer publishes g;X (corresponding to every 
authorised set X). Let the reconstruction protocol be the same as 
in the original Pinch scheme and let V~ be the fmal result. Every 
participant x E X, can verify whether 
Vx? v~ 
gx =gx 
If the verifIcation fails, then cheating has occurred in the protocol 
and thus the computed secret is not valid. This protocol detects 
cheating but does not detect the cheat(s) and also cannot prevent 
cheating. That is, the cheater(s) obtain the secret while the others 
gain nothing. 
How to prevent cheating: tet C = 1:xex g;x correspond to an 
authorised set X. We assume that in the initialisation phase of the 
Pinch scheme the dealer also publishes Cx = gx
c . Note that this 
extra public information gives no useful information about the 
secret or about participants' shares. Otherwise, we could solve the 
discrete logarithm in M and easily solve the Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem. 
Let X be an authorised set of participants. At the reconstruction 
phase, every participant Pi E X computes g;i and broadcasts it to 
all participants in the set X. Thus, every participant Pi E X 
receives t - I values g;j corresponding to all Pj E X, Pj "* Pi' Each 
participant computes C and verifIes Cx 1:0 gxc. If the verifIcation 
fails, then the protocol stops. Let participants agree to perform 
computation in the cycle P" ... , Pt. If the check Cx 1:0 gxC is suc-
cessful, then each participant Pi (i = 1, .... , t) knows the true value 
Gi-I of its predecessor (Pt is the predecessor of PI)' So participant 
Pi (i = 1, ... , t) initiates the protocol by computing (gi-I)'i and 
passing it to P,+I' The protocol proceeds as in the Pinch scheme 
and ends at Pi-2• In this way, the participant Pi-I cannot directly 
contribute to the computation which started by Pi' 
Let there exist only one cheat, Pi (1 ::; i ::; t) in the system. If Pi 
cheats, the computation initiated by Pi+! must be correct (the cor-
rectness can be verifIed as gxVx 1:0 g;;, where V x is the result 
obtained by P,cl)' That is, although cheating has occurred, the 
honest set of participants can recover the secret. 
If there exists a group of collaborating cheats, then in the above 
protocol each participant must play (simultaneously) the role of PI 
for every other tl participants in the set X. Although the number 
of computations increases rapidly, before completing the protocol 
any possible cheating will be detected and the protocol will be 
stopped. At stage j (1 < j < t), for every set of j (out of t) partici-
pants (without loss of generality, for PI' ... , P) there will be j! dif-
·ferent computations of gj ... Sj. Hence, inequality of these values 
indicates cheating in the system. Moreover, assuming the majority 
of participants are honest (this is a reasonable assumption for any 
robust secret sharing scheme) the minority of participants who 
obtain values different from the common value in stage j, are the 
cheats. 
Remark: A group of m cheats can cheat the system at the fIrst 
stage, that is, they can contribute with fake shares such that the 
resulting C is equal to the original one. However, the above proto-
col detects their cheating in next stages (there are at least 2m + 1 
stages for such a set of collaborating participants). 
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